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INTRODUCTION
Relevance of the Study
In 1970, the countrywas in a mess, The standard of livingwas
decliningrapidly and an insurgencyproblemin the countrysidehad
gained strength and momentum. Moreover, the 1969 reelection
campaign of Mr. Marcos, which was financed by massive money
creation, precipitateda balance-of-paymentscrisis. In response to
the crisis, the governmentsoughtan InternationalMonetary Fund
(IMF)-sponsored adjustmentprogramwhichcalledfor a 43 percent
devaluation and a reduction in selected tariff rateS. Despite the
measures taken, the country remained in a state of political and
economicchaos.Thispromptedthe regimeto declareMartialLaw in
1972 to institutepolitical disciplinewith the promise of economic
prosperity for all. Unfortunately, the promised prosperity never
happened.
In 1983, the countrysuffered anotherbalance-of-paymentscrisis,
this time more severe. Due to both political and economic
uncertaintiesprecipitatedby the assassinationof Senator Benigno
Aquino(a politicalrivalofMr. Marcos),capitalflightincreased,foreign
credit availability decreased, and foreign exchange reserves fell
sharply. Again, an IMF-sponsored adjustmentprogram was put in
place. This time, the political and economic implications cost the
regime its downfallin 1986.
And yet againin 1989, an impendingbalance-of-payments crisis
began to unravel.The new governmentsubmittedin March 1989 a
'The authorisAssistantDirectorattheCongressional Planning andBudgetOffice,House
of Representatives.The valuableassistancerendered by Ms, JuandaDimayugain the
revisionofthispaperisacknowledged,
!
I30 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Memorandum of Economic Policy to the IMF stating its compliance
with IMF conditionalities in exchange for financial assistance.
Already, the government had contended with six attempted coup
d'etats and with a growing clamor from the people to reform a
worsening economy. Was it then to suffer the same fate as its
predecessor? What, in the short-run period of a Fund-sponsored
program, needed to be learned in order to avoid or at least minimize
the social costs of adjustments?
A better knowledge of the immediate/short-run impact of
adjustment programs is an important ingredient in coming up with
policies to ensure the political survival of the government. The
objectives of this paper, therefore, are the following:
a) To analyze the short-run impact of adjustment programs in
.order to generate policies which are consistent with a more
stable adjustment process.
b) To test simple models showing the supply-side effects of IMF
adjustment program policies.
Limitations of the Study
Due to data constraints, the study focuses only on the 1983
balance-of-payments crisis and the subsequent IMF adjustment
program carried out in responseito the crisis.Consequently,annual
data from 1960 to 1986 are utilized to highlight the impact of
adjustmentpolicieson key macroeconomicvariables.
Organization of the Study
Section IIbegins with anoutline of typical macroeconomic policies
that are commonly utilized in Fund-sponsored-programs. A
discussion of the policy implications on key macroeconomic
variables is then presented with emphasis on the arguments of the
monetarist approach to the balance of payments and of the
structuralist models. A review of relevant literature ends the chapter.
The theoretical framework and empirical results are presented in
section II1.The supply-side effects of the IMF adjustment program
are highlighted in this chapter. In section IV, we evaluate the policy
instruments used in the 1984and 1989 adjustment programs for the
Philippines. And finally, lessons are drawn to guide us in the
implementation of the 1989 IMF-supported adjustment program.BALBOSA:IMF STABILIZATIONPROGRAM 31
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This section presentstypical Fund adjustmentpoliciesand their
impactonthe economy.The monetaristandstructuralistapproaches
are discussed to showthe contendinghypotheseson the effects of
Fund policieson keymacroeconomicvariables.A reviewof relevant
empiricalstudiesis alsopresented.
Fund-Type Stabilization Policies
AccOrdingto Tanzi (1987), the objectivesof a Fund-supported
stabilizationprogram includea balance of payments that is viable
over the medium run, the promotion of growth under a stable
economic environment, price stability, and the prevention of
excessive growth in external debt. Now,-let us supposea country
were facing balance-of-payments difficulties,acceleratinginflation,
and a blatant mismanagement of its key sectors. If we were to
deduce,the standardset of rem_edies thatthe IMF mayoffer,we may
come upwith twomacroeconomicpolicieswhichare almostalways
recommendedamongthe arrayof policychoices.These policiesare:
a) monetarycontraction, usuallyduetotheimposition ofseparate





the structuralistapproach) in orderto shed lighton the workingsof
the above policiesonthe economy.
The Structuralist Approach and the Monetarist Approach:
On Monetary Contraction. The simple form of the monetarist
approach emphasizes the direct influence of excess demand and
supply of money onthe demand for real resources and onthe balance
of payments. Under the assumption of a stable demand for money
function, anexpansionof moneystock in excess ofwhat residents are
willing to hold creates a disequilibrium in the money market. The
excess supply of money leads to greater demand for real resources.
Under the assumption offull-employment output, the greater demand32 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
for real resources can only lead to an upward pressure on prices;
hence, continuous monetary expansion is inflationary. However, the
opportunity to trade (i.e., to import) diffuses the inflationary pressures
brought about by excess demand. Increased demand for imports
brought about by excess demand in the economy results in the
drawing down of foreign exchange. Under a fixed exchange rate
system, this results in the depletion of international reserves and,
consequently, balance-of-payments deficits. The depletion of
reserves leads to a contraction of money stock, and finally to a
restoration of money market equilibrium. Note that a continuous
expansion of money stock through domestic credit expansion will
result in a worsening of the external imbalance for as long as there
are foreign exchange reserves to run down; otherwise, foreign
borrowing will have to be resorted to. Thus, to counteract this
constant pressure on the external account and the inflationary trend
in the economy, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies must be
implemented. These policies are meant to influence the rate of growth
of domestic demand and absorption. The basic objective isto restore
the balance between absorption and aggregate supply to achieve a
viable balance-of-payments position within a reasonable period of
time.
The structuralists (see Taylor 1983, van Wijnbergen 1982, Lim
1987,among others), on the other hand,point tothe slow, inadequate
or delayed decline of prices in countries that have followed the
monetarist approach as proof that the approach, in its simplistic view
of the economy, has ignored important supply-side effects that may
have prevented the desired monetarist cure from taking effect. The
structuralists emphasize the transmission channel between monetary
instruments and the supply side.of the economy via credit financing
of working capital needs. Working capital is needed to finance the
stocks of raw materials, semifinished goods, intermediate imported
inputs, advance payments to workers, among others. Typically,
working capital needs are financed by bank or curb-market credit.
This in turn implies that the cost of credit (the real interest rate) is a
component of input costs. Tight money drives up interest rates on
loans to firms for working capital and investment and thus increases
input cost. The normal business response would be to cut back on
activity and attempt to pass increased costs through to higher prices.
Even if aggregate demand fell under monetary constraint, aggregate
supplymay fall even more, so that a stagflationary phenomenon (i.e.,
recession with inflation) results.BALBOSA:IMFSTABILIZATIONPROGRAM 33
The implicationis that monetary restraintmay be stagflationary in
the short run, increasing prices and causing output contraction if
interest rate cost-push is strong enough. Thus, the first monetarist
argument that "less money means lower prices" is contrary to the
structuralist view, at least in the short run. However, the second
monetarist argument that "less money improves the foreign balance"
may be cgmpatible with the structuralist hypothesis in the sense that
output contraction reduces the intermediate imported input demand
of firms.
On Devaluation m TheReal Effects. The monetary approach
to the balance of payments sees devaluation as a useful instrument
in improving the external payments position of the economy.
Underlying this argument isthe assumption that the country is a small
open economy. Consequently, the domestic price level is significantly
affected by the country's exchange rate as well as by world prices
(Rivera-Batiz 1985). A devaluation therefore raises the domestic
price level, and consequently lowers real money balances. The
excess demand for money balances leads to a reduction in
absorption. Thus, an improvement in the external payments position
is expected. In the meantime, the expenditure-reducing effect may
lead to a fall in real output via a fall in aggregate demand. The
structuralists, on the other hand, view devaluation as primarily
increasing the costs of intermediate imported inputs, thereby
increasing costs. This leads to a fall in aggregate supply via a
reduction in the intermediate imported input demand of firms. Thus,
an improvement in trade balance is also expected, but it comes at a
high social cost. That is, a devaluation may lead to contraction not
only on the demand side but on the supply side as well. Thus, an
increase in the price level and a deeper recession is predicted.
It is worth noting that it would be misleading to suggest that Fund
programs rely exclusively on one or two policy instruments directed
solely at restraining domestic demand. Khan and Knight (1985)
emphasized that a Fund program is a much more complex policy
package than a mechanical application of the simple monetarist
approach to the balance of payments. Indeed, Fund programs have
incorporated many alternative policies including those proposed by
critics, particularly those relating to the supply side. For our purpose,
however, it is convenient to simplify and categorize Fund-type
policies into demand-side policies and supply-side policies. In line
with this dichotomy, we argue in section IV of this paper that, in the34 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
case of the Philippines, the demand-side policies are the main
emphasisof Fund-supportedadjustmentI_rograms.Thus, demand-
side policiescan be synonymouswith Fund-supportedadjustment •








The role of the commercial banking system as an intermediary
betweenprivatewealth holdersand firms,the role offoreigncapital
inflows,the importanceofthe informalmoneymarketsin the Korean
financialsystem,and the useofcredit obtainedfromthose sources
and abroad to financefixedand workingcapital, are all highlighted.
The followingresultswere obtainedfromthe study:




b) The roleofthecurbmarketisquitepersuasive.Time deposits






via the credit-workingcapitallink,have a favorable effect on
inflation.
c) It was also found that the phenomenal increasein time
depositsafterthe interestratereformin 1965was caused by
aswitchfromlendingat thecurbmarkettotime depositsand
notby additionalsavingsas isusuallyclaimed.This implies
significantsubstitutability between curb market lending and
time deposits.BALBOSA:IMF STABILIZATIONPROGRAM 35
Likewise,Lim(1987)arguedthatmonetary andcreditcontraction,
espoused bymonetarists asa keypolicy forcontrolling inflation, will
increasethecostoffinancing working capitalneeds,thusnegatively
affecting theproductive sectoroftheeconomy. Regression analysis
was utilizedto findouttheeffectsof contractionary policyon real
outputandprices.The studyusesa one-sector macromodelWith
annual data from the Philippines from 1958 to 1980. The key
variablesusedto explainrealoutputandprices weretherealwage
rate,expectedpriceinflation, i'ealexchange rate,domestic priceof
imported inputs, levelofcapital stockandinvestment, realbankloans
available, anddomestic andforeigninterest rates.Theresultsseem
to indicatesome initial increase in price inflationimmediately
following themonetarist prescription. Thisisthenfollowed_by deep
recession. Thenand0nlythendoespriceinflation starttodecline.
Thus, these resultsgiveempiricalsupportto the claimthat the
working capital cost-push, supply- sideeffect isstrong enough, which
meansthat austeritymeasuresmay requirea heavyand costly
recession beforepriceinflation canbebrought down.
Aformalassessment oftheFundstabilization program wasdone
byGylfason(1987).The authorreviewedtherelationship between
creditpolicyand growthperformance of 32 countriesunderthe
stabilization program supported bytheIMFfrom1977to 1979.The
aim of the studywasto determine whethereconomic growthwas
adverselyaffectedinthe shortrunbythe creditpoliciesadopted
under theadjustment program reviewed, andifso,towhatextent. An
analytical framework was also developed to show the
macroeconomic implication of thesupplyandcosteffectsof credit
policy.
A simplebefore-and-after comparisonapproachwas utilized,
complemented witha nonparametrlc U-testproposed by Mannand
Whitneyto measurethe statistical significance of the differences
betweenthechangeintheperformance ofthecountries understudy
fromtheyearbeforetheprogram, during theprogram year,andthe
year after the program.Tests were also done to comparethe
significanceof differencesbetweenthe behaviorof the major
macroeconomic aggregates incountries thatentered intoIMFstand-
byarrangements andthebehavior ofthesameaggregates inanother
groupofcountries thathadpersistent current account orbalance- of-
payments problems during 1975-1977butdidnotenterintostand-by
arrangements.36 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
The resultsindicate that credit expansionwas reduced markedly
andthattheoverallbalanceof paymentsimprovedsubstantially.The
inflatipn rate, althoughincreasingon average, was generally kept
below the,rates, prevailing in other non-oil-producingdeveloping
countriesl"rllese results,itappears,were achieved at the cost of a
relatively modest reduction in the average growth rate of output
duringand immediatelyafterthe programperiod.Itshouldbe keptin
mind, however, that most of the programs under review were
accompaniedbydevaluation,microeconomic supply-sidemeasures,
or increased foreign borrowing,all of which tend to counteractthe
direct negativeeffectof contractionarycreditpolicy.Nevertheless,it
appearsthatthe experiencewith thesestand-byarrangementsdoes
not give occasion for grave concern about the short-term
contractionaryor even stagflationaryconsequences of adjustment
programssupportedby,theFund.
Gylfason (1987) also pointedout the weaknesses of the before-
and-after approachincapturingthe"true" effectof Fundpolicies.The
issuesunderlyingthisapproachareadequatelydiscussedinthe 1986
paperof Goldsteinand Montiel. ,
Goldstein and Montiel (1986) discuss several methodological
problemsassociated.withestimatingthe effectsof fundprogramsin
Fund-supportedcountries.Two common approachesin evaluating
Fundprogramsare discussed.Thepurpose of the paper is to point
out problemsthat can cause "true" program effects to differ from
"estimated" Program effects when either the before-and-after
approachor the control-groupapproachis used. Both approaches
use multicountrydata.The before-and-afterapproachcalculatesfor
theselectedcountriesthe average macroeconomicoutcomesbefore
and after a Fund-supportedprogramis implemented.The approach
thentestsfor statisticalsignificanceof the differenceinthe value of
the macroeconomicvariablesbefore and after the program. On the
other hand, the control-groupapproach, by utilizing nonprogram
countriesas the basisfor comparison,accountsfor changes in the
internationaleconomicenvironmentthatcouldaltermacroeconomic
outcomesindependentlyoftheprogram.The authoremphasizedfour
factors that may influence key macroeconomicvariables (e.g., the
current account,rate of inflation,growthrate of real output,among
others),namely:
a) changes inmacroeconomic policy instruments (e.g., the rate
of domestic credit expansion, government tax revenues and
expenditures, the exchange rate, etc.);BALBOSA:IMF STABILIZATIONPROGRAM 37
b) changes in world economic conditions (suchaschangesin
world oil pricesor changesin real economicactivityin
industrial countries);
c) thetotaleffect ofa Fundprogram ifthecountry already hada
program inplaceduring theperiod; and
d) a hostof unobservable shocks thatarespecific toacountry.
Amajorflawofthebefore-and-after approach isitsreliance onthe
assumption of "otherthingsbeingequal"thatis highly implausible,
Thereexistsanempiricalproblem in isolating theeffectsof Fund
policies on macroeconomic variables.Independentpoliciesof
governments andexternalshocksencountered bythecountry are
twomajorreasonswhythebefore-and-after comparison of mean
economic outcomes forprogram countries isunlikely toyielda good
estimateof true programeffects.As such,ascribingall of the
observed changesinoutcomes totheprogramalonewillinvariably
overstate orunderstate thetrueindependent effects oftheprogram.
It isalsoworthnoting thattheauthors pointed outthefundamental
issue of Fund-type policies vis-a-vis Fund involvement.In
investigatingthe effectsof Fund:typepolicies,it is no longer
necessaryto differentiatebetween program and nonprogram
countries.Instead,the relevantcomparisonwould be between
macroeconomic outcomes underFund-type policies andthoseunder
some otherset of policies.The purposeof thistype of analysis,
therefore,istofindoutwhetherFund-typepolicies are effectiveor
ineffective inthecountry concerned.
Inthisstudy, anattempt toupdate theresults ofLim(1987)ismade
utilizing annual dataofthePhilippines from1960to1986.Finally,the
before-and-after approach isutilized tocapture theshort-run effects
of Fundpolicies onthesectoral output oftheeconomy overtheperiod
1981to 1986.Although thisstudyisalsosubject tothepitfalls of the
approach;as pointedout by Morrisand Goldstein(1986), we
nevertheless arguethatitisadequate enough tocapturetheimpact
ofthe 1984 Fund-sponsored programon sectoraloutput.The
empiricalspecifications and resultsare the subjectof the next
chapter.
EMPIRICALANALYSIS
Inthischapterwe presenta simpleempirical modelof priceand
income determination wherein boththemonetarist approach andthe
structuralisthypothesescan be tested. The before-and.after38 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
approach is also presented to test the effects of the 1984 Fund-
program on sectoral output. For conciseness of presentation we will
also give the corresponding empirical results rather than collect them
in a separate section.
The Output Function
Following the model of Lim (1987), we assume a one-sector
economy. The .productionfunction is neoclassical and output is
assumed to have three inputs:a) labor, b) capital stock, and c)
importedrawmaterialsand importedintermediateinputs.Tocapture
the determinants of the real outputof the economy, the following
semireducedform equationisformulated:
Y = F (w, RER, MS, ITB, INFe, K)
where,
Y = real output
w = real wagerate
RER = real exchangerate
MS = moneysupply
ITB = Jnterestrateon90-day Treasurybills
INFe = expectedinflationrate
K = levelof capitalstock.
On the supplyside,we postulatethatrealoutput (Y) isdetermined-
bythe levelof capitalstock(K), aswell asbythe real costsof inputs.
The realwage rate (w) accountsfor thecostsof labor,whilethe real
exchangerate(RER) accountsforthecostsof intermediateimported
inputs.The moneysupply(MS), interestonTreasury bills(ITB), and
expected inflation (INFe) capture the cost of working capital.
Following simple rules of adaptive expectations, INFe can be
representedby lag valuesofthe inflationrate.
The interestonTreasurybillsservedasaproxyvariableforlending
rates due to data constraints.We assumethat lenderssee perfect
substitutability betweenTreasury billsandIoanablefundsforworking
capital needs, Thus, the higher the ITB, the higher the cost of
financingworkingcapital.The moneysupply(MS) isalsoexpectedto
have a significanteffectonoutputvia theworkingcapitalhypothesis.
Contractionin the moneysupplydecreases the supplyof Ioanable
funds, thusincreasingthe costof financingworkingcapital.Another
factor affecting the lending rate is expected inflation. A higherBALBOSA: IMF STABILIZATION PROGRAM 39
expectedinflationrate reducesthe real lendingrates.•Thus, the
investor mustredirectIoanable fundstootherassetswhosevalues
donotfallwithpriceinflation. Theresulting scarcity of Ioanable funds
exertsanupward pushonthecostofworking capitalviaariseinthe
lendingrates.
Ontheaggregate demand side,areduction inMSresults inafallin
aggregatedemand;thus,a fallinoutput mayfollow.Anincreasein
lendingrates (given'by ITB) resultsin a decrease in desired
investment andthereforeleadsto afall inaggregatedemand.For
INFe,weexpectthatahigher expected inflation rateinduces present
consumption overfutureconsumption, thereby increasing aggregate
demandforgoodsandservices.
•Following themonetary approach, wenotethatthemechanism by
whichtheexchange ratecanaffect output isthrough thedemandand
supply of real money balancesand absorption.We note that
absorptionis influenced,amongother factors,by real money
balances,whichareconsequently influenced bythedomestic price
level.Initssimpleform,theapproach yieldstheproposition thatthe
domestic pricelevelisdetermined bythenominal exchange rateas
well as worldprices.Thus,a devaluation, holdingallotherthings
constant, willreduce absorption viareduction inrealmoney balances.
Moreover, asthetradedgoods prices riserelative tonontraded goods
prices,expenditure switching mayoccur,causing anexpansionary
effect onthenontraded goodsector.
Table1summarizes theresultoftherealoutput model. Table1,as
wellasTable2, usesbothOLSandInstrumental Variable (i.e.,TSLS
procedure)estimatesto accountfor the fact that ITB is an
endogenous variable whichisusedasanindependent variable inthe




withTSLS. WefindRERandITBsignificantly andnegatively related
torealoutputat the5 percent levelofsignificance. Itisinteresting to
notethat moneysupply(MS) has notshownmuchinfluencein
determiningreal output (even consideringlagged variables).
However, tightmonetary policy isbestreflected bythehighnegative
correlation betweenITBandY,suchthata 1percentincrease inITB
mayleadtoabout0.14percent(inOLS) or0.22 percent(inTSLS)
reduction inoutput. A1percent realdepreciation, ontheotherhand,
mayleadtoanoutputcontraction of 0.15percent(inOLS)or0.0840 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
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Table 1
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REAL OUTPUT
Dependent Variable: In Y
Explanatory OLS TSLS a
Variables Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
C 1.50 1.56 0.82 0.68
1n w _-0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.07
1n RER -0.15 -2.25 =_ -0.08 -0.86
In MS *0.10 -1.00 -0.14 -1.20
in ITB -0.14 -2.74 _ -0.22 2.86 °_
INFe -0.13 -1.48 -0.06 -0.52
1n K 0.83 4.13 ° 0.93 3.98 °
R-squared 0.9896 0.9870
Adj. R-squared 0_9834 0.9792
F-value 159.08 _ 126.28 _
DW 1.40 1.46
n 17 17
Sample Range 1970-86 1970-86
Noles; a The RHS endogenous variable is In ITB,
Instrument list: C In w In RER In MS INFe In K In G In y6
• Denotes significance at the 1 _.,ercentlevel,
• al Denotes significance at the 5 percent level,
,i•• Denotes significance at the 10 percent level.
percent (in TSLS). We found multicollinearity problems in the model.
This may cause a downward bias on our t-scores but it will not bias
our estimators.
Comparing with Lim's findings, his OLS and TSLS functions show
that monetary-related variables do affect the supply function
significantly. Real bank loans have positive effects on output
particularly in the post-1971 period. Interest rates were found to have
significant negative influences on the supply function. Inthis regard,
Lim's results are consistent with this study.
The Price Inflation Function
The semireduced form equation derived from Lim(1987) yields the
following function for price inflation:BALBOSA:IMF STABILIZATIONPROGRAM 41
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Table 2 ,
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PRICE INFLATION
Dependent Var able: Ap
Explanato[y OLS TSLS a
Variables Coal. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
C 0.22 4.50e 0.22 4.38 e
^w -0,07 -0.36 -0.08 -0.43
^RER -0,41 .3.01 e° -0.43 -2,98 ee
^MS 0,27 1.42 0.32 1.47
dlTB 0.02 6.14e 0.03 4.13 °
dlNFe -0.04 -0.40 -0.07 -0.56
^K -1,49 -2,64 °e -1.60 -2.60 ee
R-squared 0.8529 0.8452
Adj. R-squared 0,7548 0.7420
F-value 8,70 e 8.19 e
DW 2.14 2.12
n 16 16
Sample Range 1971-86 1971-86
Notes: a The RHS endogenous variable Is dl'rB.
Ihstrument llst'. CAW ARER _ dlNFe ^KIn GIn ya
I Denotes $ignlfloartce at the 1 parent level,
,lie Oenotes significance el the $ peroent level,
goo Denotes ei_lNfk_rloe at the 10 percent level.
^P = F (^w, ^RER,^MS, dlTB, dlNFe,^K )
where,
^P = theinflation rate
^ = thegrowth rateofvariables
d = thefirstdifference.
Arisein^RER(adepreciation) isexpected tohaveapositive effect
ontheinflationratewhetherfromthemonetarists' orstructuralists'
pointof view.Ontheotherhand,monetary contraction will havean
ambiguous effectontheprice level.Monetary contraction isexpected
tohaveapositive effect'on theinflation rateviathedemandsideand
a negativeeffectviathe supplyside.The workings of the money
supplyontheinflation rateviathelending ratesarebestcaptured by42 jOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
the instrumental variable method using dlTB as the right-hand side
endogenous variable.
Table 2 summarizes the result of the Price Inflation model. Overall,
the RER, ITB, and K show a significant influence on price inflation.
The result forITB strongly confirms th_belief of the structuralists. We
also note that MS has an insignificant effect on prices although its
coefficient is much bigger (i.e., it has a more important effect) than
iTB. Moreover, the sign of the MS coefficient confirms the
deflationary effect of money supply on the price lever. The result on
RER is curiously contrary to what we expected.
Concerning the capital stock level, the result in this model as well
as in the real output model affirms the crucial role of capital formation
in economic growth. No autocorrelation problem was detected in both
models. Lim's findings on price inflation reveals that, in the short run,
the working capital cost-push effect seems to dominate. Lending
rates were found to have a significantly positive effect, while the sign
for the growth rate of real bank loans was negative. His findings seem
to point to a "stronger supply-side, working capital cost-push
inflationary push than to the demand-side, monetarist deflationary
pull." Lim's result on the lending rates seems to corroborate our
finding on the effect of ITB onthe inflation rate. Onthe other hand, the
sign of our MS coefficient (which is positive) reveals the dominance
of the monetarist's deflationary pull. However, its t-score fails to
establish its significance.
The Before-and-After Approach
We used the before-and-after approachto investigatewhether
sectoraloutputwas adverselyaffected in the shortrunby the credit
policies adopted under an adjustment program. Due to data
limitations,we utilized the real outputof the manufacturing sector
overthe years 1981to 1986. FollowingMontes (1987), we assumed
the implementationof the Fund programtohave begun in earnest in
1984. The task was to compare real sectoral output before the
program to real sectoral output after 1984. Moreover, we
hypothesizedthatthegreaterthe needforworkingcapitalof a sector,
the more it is affected by contractionarymonetary policies. We
assumedthatworkingcapitalisneeded tofinancethe laborcostsand
intermediateimportedinputcosts of a firm. Thus, the more import-
dependent and labor-usinga firm is, the more it is affected by the
costsof obtainingworkingcapital.BALBOSA:IMF STABILIZATIONPROGRAM 43
Byusing theWilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test(ortheW-test),wecan
determinewhethersectoraloutputsignificantlydecreased after 1984.
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Table 3
SUMMARY OF W-TEST RESULTS ON TREND
OF REAL SECTORAL OUTPUT, 1981-1986
Sector Decision
Food Manufactures Reject Ho
Beverage • Accept Ho
Tobacco Accept Ho
• Textiles Reject Ho
Footwear Reject Ho
Wood and Wood Products Reject Ho
Furniture and Fixtures Reject Ho
Paper Products Accept Ho
Printing Reject Ho
Leather Products Reject Ho
Rubber Reject Ho
Chemical Products Reject Ho
Petroleum Products Reject Ho
Non-metallic Mineral Products
(cement and glass products) Reject Ho
Basic Metal
(including iron and steel products) Accept Ho
Metal Products
(fabricated metals) Reject Ho
Machinery
(non-electrical machinery,.
equipments and parts) Reject Ho
Electrical Machinery Accept Ho
Transport Equipment Reject Ho
TOTAL OUTPUT Reject Ho
Source of raw date: 1988 Philippine Statistical Yearbook.
Note: Ho: Real output remained constant from 1981 to f 986,
Na: Real output significantly declined after 1984,
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Overall, 13 (or 72 percent) out of 18 industries listed in Table 3
show a significant decline in real output after 1984. However, caution
must be exercised in interpreting the results because there are other
factors which may determine the trends of sectoral output over time.
The W-test simply described the industry behavior during the IMF
Stabilization Program,
LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The 1984 and 1989 IMF Program
Under the December 1984 agreement (the 18th Stand-by
Agreementwith the IMF), the Philippinegovernmenthad taken the
followingmeasuresbeforefinancingwas extended:
a) a reduction in high-powered money through ceilings on
domesticborrowing;
b) the floating of the exchange rate, which .resulted in the
depreciationof the currency;
c) a reformof the foreignexchangesystem by adoptinga more
liberaltrade policy;
d) anincreaseininterestratesonCentralBankbillsandTreasury
bills to approximately40 percent at the time of.the float,
togetherwith increasesin several other lendingand deposit
rates;
e) the implementation of significant,tax revejnue generating
measures; and
f) increasesinadministeredpricestoreflectmarket conditions.
On the Memorandum on Economic Policy submitted by the
government in March 1989, the following policy measures and
adjustmentswere outlined:
a) a reductioninthe growthrateof moneyandcreditbyabout12
percentovertheperiod1989to1992fromitsactual1987level
of 15 percentannually;
b) the removalof impedimentstoprivatesectoractivitythrough
a dismantlingof monopoliesand special privilegesin some
sectors;
c) trade policyreform emphasizinga competitiveand outward-
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d) public sector reformthroughthe privatization of government
parastatals, a reduction in the government deficit through tax
reforms, and decreases in investment spending; and
e) areform package togenerate domesticsaving largely through
the government sector.
Indeed, a cursory review of the 1984 and 1989 adjustment
programs indicates that there was not much difference between the
two. Monetary policy through the control of domestic credit and
exchange rate programs were the main policies put in place. Itshould
also be notedthat the 1989program called for a strict reduction inthe
government's role in the economy (i.e., government activities that
overlap with the private sector activities were eliminated or at least
minimized). Not surprisingly, these policy measures were the ones
we referred to as typical Fund-type stabilization policies.
Summary, Lessons, and Policy Implications
We learned that a primarydeterminant ofoutput and the domestic
pricelevelisthe lendingrate.The resultssuggestthattightmonetary
policymayindeedinducepricestofall,corroborating themonetarists'
belief. However, the effectof thispolicyon the lendingrates should
not be ignored. One has to consider the profound effects of the
volatilityof lendingrates onthe economyvia the supply-sideeffects
of financing working capital. Our nonparametrictest (the W-test)
indicates a significant decline in the real output of selected
manufacturing industries which can be traced to tight monetary
policy.Moreover, policiesthatraisethe real effectiveexchangerate
have a contractionaryeffect on output,but their inflationaryeffect
could not be firmly established by the results. And finally, we
confirmedthe importanceof investmentandthe levelof capitalstock
on the growthof real output.Such expansionin outputmitigatesthe
inflationarypressuresinthe economy.
The task for the 1990s, therefore, istocome up with policiesthat
take into consideration the stagflationaryeffect of contractionary
policies,the roleof the real exchangerateonoutputand prices,and
the importanceof investmentandcapitalstockinthe economy.With
these in mind, caution shouldbe exercised in implementingfuture
adjustmentprograms.Targetsto lowermonetaryaggregatesbased
on the monetaryapproachframeworkalone may underestimateor
not capture the "true" effects on output and prices. Moreover, credit ....46 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
which is shownto have an importantrolein the real sector, mustbe
adequately providedto preventstagflationarypressures. However,
thisshouldbe clonewithinthe contextof developinga more.dynamic
economythatcanfullyexploreitscomparativeadvantage. Finally,a
reductionin the governmentdeficitiscalledfor in orderto min!mize
the crowding-outeffectexperiencedbythe privatesectorduringthe
1970s and 1980s.This can be donewithinthe contextof:
_a) a general reduction in government expendituresthrough
determined and programmed reduction in the size of the
government bureaucracy and the establishment of a system
ofprioritizing government projects (especially ininfrastructure)
which strongly adheres to economic efficiency criteria; arid
b) an improvement in the tax _¢.,o_ection machinery through
structural and administrative reforms in the tax system.BALBOSA:IMF STABILIZATIONPROGRAM 47
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